In our September 15, 2026 post, The Evolving Law of Enablement: Federal Circuit Decisions in Wyeth and Teva Form a “Yin and Yang” Framework, we examined how the Federal Circuit reached opposite enablement outcomes in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co. and Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, emphasizing the role of the claimed limitations and the state of the art in each case.

The Federal Circuit’s subsequent denial of panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co. leaves intact the panel’s April 2026 decision, Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 172 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2026), holding that Teva’s method-of-treatment claims directed to anti-CGRP antibodies are enabled. But Judge Dyk’s dissent in the denial of rehearing en banc raises a significant question about the scope of the enablement requirement for method claims—and, in particular, whether the panel’s decision creates a potential path around the Supreme Court’s ruling in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023).

The dissent also invokes the Federal Circuit’s decision in Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013), for the principle that a genus may be well known even though the specific embodiments with the desired qualities are not enabled.

Background of Teva: A Method Claim to a Broad Genus

The dispute in Teva concerns two patents directed to methods of treating headache using anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies. Claim 30 of the U.S. Patent No. 8,586,045 was representative. Claim 30, read together with claim 17 from which it depends, recites:

A method for reducing incidence of or treating headache in a human comprising administering to the human an effective amount of an anti-CGRP antagonist antibody, wherein said antagonist is a…humanized monoclonal antibody.

After a jury verdict in Teva’s favor, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Lilly judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement. The district court concluded that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies.

In April 2026, a Federal Circuit panel reversed. With respect to enablement, the panel emphasized the distinction between a claim directed to the antibodies themselves and a claim directed to a “method of using those antibodies to treat headache.” The panel concluded that the relevant inquiry was whether the specification enabled the claimed method of treatment—not whether it enabled the making and use of every antibody falling within the claimed genus for every possible purpose. The panel distinguished Amgen, in which the Supreme Court held that claims directed to a broad genus of PCSK9-blocking antibodies were not enabled across their full scope. Lilly subsequently petitioned for rehearing en banc. On September 30, 2026, the Federal Circuit denied the petition. Judge Dyk was the sole judge to dissent from the denial.

Judge Dyk: The Antibody Remains a Claim Limitation

Judge Dyk’s dissent focuses on what he views as a fundamental flaw in distinguishing Teva from Amgen based on the claim’s characterization as a method of treatment. Even if the method claim is narrower than a claim directed solely to an antibody genus, he argues, the antibody remains an express claim limitation that must itself be enabled:

“Even if [the method claim] were [narrower], the compound still must be enabled since the compound is indisputably a claim limitation.”

Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 24-1094, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2026) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Judge Dyk further explains that “[c]laiming a method of use that depends on a recited component cannot excuse the enablement requirement of the component.” Id.

The disagreement, therefore, concerns whether limiting a claim by therapeutic use sufficiently narrows its scope to satisfy enablement when the claim still encompasses a broad genus of antibodies.

The Amgen Concern: Can a Method Claim Avoid Full-Scope Enablement?

The significance of Judge Dyk’s dissent extends beyond the anti-CGRP antibodies at issue in Teva. His concern is that the panel’s reasoning could allow patentees to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023), by recasting a broad genus claim as a method-of-treatment claim.

In Amgen, the Supreme Court held that claims to antibodies defined by their ability to bind PCSK9 and block its interaction with the LDL receptor were not enabled across their full scope. The Court explained that a specification must enable the full scope of the claimed invention without requiring undue experimentation. Amgen, 598 U.S. at 612–14.

Judge Dyk rejects the panel’s distinction between Amgen and Teva. In Teva, the claims recite a method of treating headache by administering a humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibody. According to Judge Dyk, because the record did not suggest uses for these antibodies other than treating headache, the practical scope of the method claim equals the scope of the antibody genus—and, in any event, the antibody remains a limitation of the claimed method and therefore must itself be enabled across the scope of the claim.

He illustrates the potential problem by observing:

“Had Amgen simply claimed a cholesterol-lowering method using such antibodies, the scope of Amgen’s patent would not have been meaningfully narrowed.”

Teva, at 5 (Dyk, J., dissenting).

He then warns:

“Yet according to the panel opinion in this case, the patentee in Amgen could have evaded the enablement requirement by doing exactly that.”

Id.

Judge Dyk’s point is not that Teva expressly conflicts with Amgen, but that a patentee might obtain substantially the same practical scope that Amgen deemed non-enabled simply by framing the claim as a method of treatment. If the method claim still encompasses essentially the same broad universe of antibodies, changing the claim’s form may not meaningfully reduce the experimentation needed to practice it. Judge Dyk notes that amici characterized the panel opinion as creating an “end-run around Amgen.” Id. (quoting Amicus Br. of Johnson & Johnson and Nagra USA LLC at 10–12).

The Wyeth Comparison: A Known Genus Is Not Necessarily an Enabled Genus

Judge Dyk’s reasoning also brings Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013) into the discussion. In Wyeth, the Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment that claims directed to methods of treating or preventing restenosis using a genus of rapamycin compounds were not enabled. As Judge Dyk describes it, the court concluded that although a class of compounds effective for treatment was known, undisclosed individual species of the claimed genus were not enabled. As Judge Dyk explains:

“It is established that a genus may be well known but the specific embodiments with the desired qualities are not enabled by knowledge of the genus.”

Teva, at 3 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1383–86).

The comparison is significant. In Wyeth, the fact that a class of rapamycin compounds was known did not establish that the full scope of the claimed genus was enabled. Judge Dyk suggests that the same principle should inform the analysis in Teva: the fact that anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies were “well known” as a genus does not answer whether the specific antibody species with antagonist qualities—which, he notes, were not well known—were enabled.

The distinction, therefore, is not simply between a “composition claim” and a “method claim.” Rather, the question is whether the patent enables the full scope of every limitation necessary to practice the claimed invention.

Why the Distinction Between Teva and Amgen Matters

The Federal Circuit panel did not hold that method-of-treatment claims are categorically exempt from the full-scope enablement requirement. Rather, it focused on the particular claims and the evidence concerning the therapeutic use of anti-CGRP antibodies, concluding that the specification sufficiently enabled the claimed method of treating headache.

Judge Dyk’s dissent questions whether that focus adequately addresses the antibody limitation itself. Evidence that the claimed antibodies share a therapeutic function does not necessarily establish that the full antibody genus can be practiced without undue experimentation.

For life sciences patent drafting, the distinction is consequential. Method-of-treatment claims may provide meaningful limits through a specific therapeutic use, but those limits do not necessarily resolve whether a broad genus of molecules recited in the claims is enabled. Judge Dyk’s dissent highlights the continuing tension between claiming a therapeutic application and satisfying the full-scope enablement requirement for the molecules used to carry it out.

What Does Teva Mean for Life Sciences Patent Drafting?

The Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing leaves the panel’s decision intact, but Judge Dyk’s dissent identifies an issue that may continue to arise in future life sciences cases.

The practical question is whether a patentee can obtain broader protection for a genus of therapeutic molecules by claiming the genus through a “method of treatment” rather than through a “composition claim.”

The answer may depend heavily on the particular facts. A method claim may genuinely be narrower than a composition claim where the claimed therapeutic use meaningfully limits the scope of the invention. But Judge Dyk’s dissent suggests that courts should be wary of treating the claim’s format as dispositive where the underlying genus remains broad and the claimed use does not materially narrow the practical scope of the claim.

This distinction is particularly significant for biologics and other therapeutics, where claims often define molecules by their functional rather than structural characteristics. The ability to identify and produce representative members of a genus does not necessarily establish enablement across its full scope. Although evidence of a predictable therapeutic effect may support enablement of a method-of-treatment claim, the question remains whether the specification enables the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.

Looking Ahead

For now, Teva remains precedential Federal Circuit authority. The court’s September 30, 2026 order denying panel rehearing and rehearing en banc leaves intact the panel’s reversal of the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, which reinstated the jury’s verdict of willful infringement and $176.5 million in damages, subject to further proceedings on remand. Lilly has until December 29, 2026, to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, absent an extension.

Whether Teva represents the “end-run around Amgen” that the amici feared may depend less on the panel’s doctrinal framing than on the unusual record behind it. Teva rested on two factual pillars: that anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies were already well known based on Lilly’s own statements to the Patent Office in earlier inter partes review proceedings that such antibodies were “well known in the art,” that humanization was “routine,” and that every humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibody would treat headache, a point Lilly did not dispute on appeal. On that record, the panel treated the antibody genus as a known tool used in the claimed invention, rather than as the invention itself.

The Federal Circuit’s decision two days later in Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Inari Agriculture, Inc., No. 25-1287 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2026) (nonprecedential), illustrates the point. Writing for a panel that included Judge Cunningham and Judge Dyk, Judge Prost, who also authored Teva, affirmed the Board’s holding that all claims of a patent reciting a functionally defined genus of dual herbicide-degrading enzymes were not enabled, including eighteen method-of-controlling-weeds claims. This case did not involve antibodies and the court did not separately analyze the method claims, but Pioneer’s specification described the enzyme as a “highly novel discovery,” placing the genus at the heart of the invention rather than in the background art, and the method claims fell with the composition claims. Pioneer suggests that, at least where the recited genus is itself the inventive contribution, Amgen’s default rule continues to apply to method claims.

A pending appeal may offer the Federal Circuit an opportunity to define Teva’s limits in the antibody context. In OssiFi-Mab LLC v. Amgen Inc., 830 F. Supp. 3d 131 (D. Mass. 2026), the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment that method claims reciting the use of anti-sclerostin antibodies in combination with antiresorptive drugs to treat low bone density were invalid for lack of written description and enablement. The patentee argued that anti-sclerostin antibodies were a class already well known in the prior art, pointing to Amgen’s own earlier patent publication disclosing twenty-eight such antibodies with sequence data, and that it need only show possession of the method of treatment, not the underlying antibodies. The court disagreed, holding that the written description test is the same “whether the claim is to a novel compound or a novel combination of known elements,” and that the specification identified only a handful of antibodies by alphanumeric designation, none with a disclosed sequence and none shown to bind human sclerostin. The court also held that, because skilled artisans would need to “make candidate antibodies and screen them to determine which ones perform the claimed functions,” the claims were not enabled. Notably, the court applied both requirements to claims that recited antibody treatment only in a limiting preamble, reasoning that a contrary rule “would permit a patentee to use a limiting preamble to recite even completely unknown claim limitations.” The court separately held that the specification did not describe the claimed combination methods themselves, which it found had no working examples. The patentee appealed to the Federal Circuit on April 1, 2026.

OssiFi-Mab shares Teva’s method-of-treatment format, but it lacks much of the record that supported the Teva panel’s conclusion. The patentee’s own expert conceded that, without Amgen’s publication, the class could be described as “known” but not necessarily “well known.” The patentee’s experts also agreed that a sclerostin-binding antibody does not necessarily antagonize sclerostin’s function, and the record contained no counterpart to the undisputed Teva finding that every member of the genus performs the claimed use. Most significantly, the district court held that the specification failed to describe the claimed combination methods and was not supported by experiments or working examples.  Accordingly, based on the current record, the facts appear distinguishable from Teva.

Prospects for Supreme Court Review

The questions to be presented in petition for certiorari connect directly to Amgen, e.g., whether a claim’s full-scope enablement requirement can be satisfied by a functional antibody genus recited within a method-of-treatment claim. The amicus support at the rehearing stage was notable: Amgen, Sanofi, Merck, Ipsen, and Johnson & Johnson—amici that Judge Dyk described as “not known for urging onerous requirements for patentability”—urged rehearing and warned of uncertainty for courts, the Patent Office, and industry.

However, only one judge dissented, the en banc poll failed, and the panel’s holding rests on a fact-specific record: Lilly’s prior IPR statements characterizing the antibodies as well known and their humanization as routine, an undisputed finding that all qualifying antibodies treat headache, and a posture in which the challenger bore a clear-and-convincing burden against a jury verdict. Teva will likely argue that the decision applies decades-old precedent on known components of a claimed combination, whereas Amgen addressed claims to novel antibodies themselves. And Pioneer and OssiFi-Mab give Teva anecdotal evidence that the feared drafting loophole has not materialized.

As such, the Supreme Court may view Teva as a narrow, fact-specific decision. If certiorari is denied, subsequent cases will be decided case-by-case where the key question is likely to be whether the recited genus was well-known.

Practical Takeaways

For patentees, Teva is not a reliable substitute for full-scope enablement of a functionally defined genus, particularly where the genus is new or the claimed use is its only use.

Claims of varying scope including claims to structurally defined species and subgenera supported by working examples and data remain the gold standard. The case is a reminder that positions taken in one forum can significantly impact the analysis in another.  For example, characterizing a genus as well known and routine in an IPR or during prosecution may later support a finding that the genus is background technology for § 112 purposes. In both settings, the record including claim amendments, admissions, and arguments is likely to matter more than merely the claim format.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.

Two Federal Circuit decisions, three months apart, analyzed enablement of similarly broad method-of-treatment claims, but reached opposite outcomes. In April, the court reversed a JMOL of invalidity and reinstated a $176.5 million verdict in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly and Company. Three months later, in Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, the same court affirmed a JMOL wiping out a $107.5 million verdict on nearly the same legal theory. Both cases involved broad, functionally-drafted method-of-treatment claims tested against the enablement standard set by the Supreme Court in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi. A side-by-side comparison offers lessons on the current state of enablement law.

Key Takeaways

  • In Teva, the claimed genus of anti-CGRP antibodies was well-understood and routine to produce in the art, allowing a single representative species and established protocols to enable the full scope of the claims.
  • In Wyeth, the claimed “unit dosage” requirement – a daily dose “calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect” in a patient – necessarily contemplates a repeatable, practical dosing regimen, not merely a compound’s ability to inhibit EGFR or kill cancer cells in vitro.
  • The Federal Circuit in Wyeth emphasized that the claims did not require FDA-level proof of safety or efficacy. Nevertheless, because the claims required daily administration of a therapeutic unit dosage to a patient, the specification still needs to teach how to arrive at such a dosage without undue experimentation.
  • Neither decision required clinical safety or efficacy data to satisfy § 112(a). The Wyeth panel was explicit that the claims did not need FDA-level proof of safety; they needed enough disclosure to allow a skilled artisan to reach a workable, non-toxic dosage without undue experimentation.
  • Read together, the two decisions indicate that functional claiming survives enablement scrutiny where the underlying art is mature and predictable, but requires the specification to do the translational work itself where in vivo behavior remains genuinely unpredictable.

The facts of each case explain why the Wyeth decision stands in sharp contrast to Teva. While both cases evaluated broad genus method-of-treatment claims, the divergent outcomes highlight how enablement turns on where the primary technical uncertainty resides. In Teva, the claims were directed to using a well-understood class of humanized anti-CGRP antibodies to treat headaches, where standard art-established protocols enabled skilled artisans to practice the full scope from a single working species. Conversely, in Wyeth, the claimed novelty and explicit limitations resided in the human dosing regimen itself, yet the patent left the critical task of translating in vitro activity into non-toxic human administration entirely to the reader’s trial-and-error experimentation.

Analyzing the contrast between Wyeth and Teva v. Eli Lilly reveals clear boundaries for method-of-treatment claim drafting:

In Teva v. Eli Lilly, the Court found that the claimed composition genus (anti-CGRP antibodies) was well-understood in the prior art, allowing a single representative species and background knowledge to enable the method. In Wyeth, even if irreversible EGFR inhibitors were conceptually known, the Court found that the dosing regimen in human patients was unpredictable. Therefore, disclosure of a broad range and reliance on the physician to determine the dose were not enabling.

Wyeth underscores that when a method claim requires daily administration to a human patient, in vitro cell-killing data alone is insufficient unless the patent provides a reliable dose translation mechanism or working human dosing models.

While disclosing some inoperative embodiments is not automatically fatal, disclosing broad ranges where preferred species exceed maximum tolerated human doses forces undue experimentation to identify functional dosages.

In each of these cases, the outcome turned on the key limitation that distinguished the claims from the prior art, i.e., dosage regimen/toxicity in Wyeth, and use of a class of antibodies for a specific indication in Teva.  The record evidence was critical in this regard, i.e., undisputed evidence of toxicity in the disclosed dosage ranges in Wyeth versus Lilly’s prior assertions in inter partes review proceedings that anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies were well known and their use was routine in Teva.

FeatureWyeth v. AstraZenecaTeva V. Eli Lilly
Claim FocusSpecific human dosing regimen (“unit dosage”).Use of a genus of molecules (anti-CGRP antibodies) for a specific indication.
Primary UncertaintyTranslation of in vitro activity to in vivo human administration.Production and binding mechanics of the molecules.
State of the ArtHuman dosing for these inhibitors was unpredictable.Anti-CGRP antibodies were well-known and routine to produce.
Disclosure QualityBroad ranges; preferred embodiments were toxic/inoperative.Single representative species enabled the full scope via established protocols.
OutcomePatent Invalid. Permanently set aside a $107.5 million jury verdict.Patent Not Invalid. Reinstated $176.5 million verdict.

Background on Wyeth

The patents-in-suit, U.S. Patents 10,603,314 (‘314 patent) and 10,596,162 (‘162 patent), claimed methods of treating gefitinib- and erlotinib-resistant (“g/e resistant”) non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) using irreversible EGFR inhibitors — compounds that covalently bind cysteine 773 (or cysteine 805 of erb-B2) rather than forming the reversible, non-covalent bonds characteristic of first-generation drugs like gefitinib and erlotinib.[1] Representative claim 1 of the ‘314 patent required “administering daily to the patient” a “unit dosage” of the claimed inhibitor.[2]

The specification defined “unit dosage” as a “predetermined quantity of active material calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect,” and identified only three exemplary compounds — EKB-569, HKI-357, and HKI-272 — supported solely by in vitro data.[3] It offered a “general” dosage range of 0.5 to 1000 mg/kg and a “projected” daily total of 1 to 1000 mg (preferably 2 to 500 mg), but stated the “[p]recise amounts… depend on the judgment of the practitioner.”[4]

A Delaware jury found the claims not invalid and found that AstraZeneca’s Tagrisso (osimertinib) induced infringement, awarding Wyeth $107.5 million.[5] The district court later overturned the jury’s verdict by granting AstraZeneca’s renewed motion for judgement as a matter of law, holding the claims invalid for lack of enablement. The court reasoned that the patents “provide[d] ‘only a starting point, a direction for future research'” and left skilled artisans to “an iterative, trial-and-error approach.”[6] (quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 939–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

Claim Construction: The Significance of “Daily” and “To the Patient”

Wyeth’s first argument was that the district court injected FDA-style safety and efficacy requirements into the claims post-verdict. The panel disagreed. It held that the claim terms “administer[ed] daily” and “to the patient” must be given independent meaning under Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that claim terms must be construed to avoid rendering any claim language superfluous), and that doing so “draws the claims beyond merely requiring ‘killing cancer cells,’ yet constrains them short of requiring full-blown FDA-type clinical safety standards.”[7] In other words, the claims require “a repeatable dosing regimen” “tailored for practical administration to a human patient, not merely any concentration capable of producing anti-cancer effects in vitro.”[8]

Enablement: In Vitro Data Doesn’t Enable an In Vivo Limitation

Applying Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594, 610 (2023) (“[t]he more one claims, the more one must enable”[9]), and Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the panel held the specification “leaves the determination of the claimed ‘unit dosage’ entirely to the knowledge of the skilled artisan,” which is insufficient standing alone.[10] (citing Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). It was undisputed that the specification contains no working example of a unit dosage “calculated to achieve a therapeutic effect and suitable for daily administration in human patients.”[11]

The record evidence hurt Wyeth further. Trial testimony — including from Wyeth’s own expert and a co-inventor — established that the disclosed dosage ranges for at least two of the three exemplary compounds exceeded the maximum tolerated dose in humans.[12] (citing J.A. 17397–98, J.A. 17549; 17563, J.A. 11804, 11807). Slip op. at 16–17. The court treated that as strong evidence of non-enablement under Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held that substantial inoperative embodiments can render claims not enabled when practicing the full scope requires undue experimentation. ([I]f the number of inoperative combinations become significant, and in effect forces one of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid). Id.

Importantly, the panel was careful to frame this as an enablement gap, not a toxicity limitation read into the claims: “the district court did not hold that the claims require proof that every claimed dosage be non-toxic, non-lethal, or satisfy any freestanding FDA clinical safety criteria.”[13] Rather, the toxicity evidence mattered because it showed the specification gives “little guidance as to which disclosed dosages, if any, are suitable for daily administration to a patient across the functionally claimed class of compounds” — which is “precisely the type of undue experimentation that the enablement requirement forbids.” (citing ALZA Corp., 603 F.3d at 941, 943).[14]

The court concluded by emphasizing the distinction between FDA approval and patent enablement: patentees may generally claim a dosing method “without showing actual clinical data,” leaving safety and efficacy determinations to the FDA.[15] “The problem with these patents is that, perhaps because of close prior art, their claims are limited to dosage forms to be administered to patients, yet they disclosed only a broad range of doses some of which were shown to be toxic, and they disclosed no actual dosages for any compound within the scope of the claims.”[16] In short, the patents failed because the specification did not enable skilled artisans to practice the full scope of the claimed therapeutic dosing methods.

Practical Implications

The Federal Circuit’s decision offers several practical lessons for patent applicants prosecuting method-of-treatment claims.

First, claim narrowing can have enablement consequences. Wyeth added the “unit dosage” administered daily limitation to overcome the prior art. The Federal Circuit construed that added claim language in accordance with the specification’s express definition: “physically discrete units suitable as unitary dosage for the subject, each unit containing a predetermined quantity of active material calculated to produce the desired therapeutic effect” – and that same limitation ultimately proved fatal to enablement. Had the claims been directed more broadly to inhibition of EGFR or cancer-cell killing, the existing disclosure may have been sufficient to survive the enablement inquiry. But by claiming administering a daily therapeutic dosing regimen of a unit dosage to patients, however, the specification needed to teach skilled artisans how to practice that limitation without undue experimentation.

Second, relying on the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill cannot substitute for an enabling disclosure. The specification stated that “[t]he skilled artisan is aware of the effective dose for each patient,” but the Federal Circuit viewed that statement as evidence that the patent left the critical dosing determination to the reader. The court reiterated a familiar principle of enablement: while the knowledge of a skilled artisan may supplement a disclosure, it cannot supply the invention’s missing teachings.[17]

Third, patent applicants and challengers should carefully consider the examples in the specification identified as preferred embodiments – forms of the invention the patent presents as particularly desirable.  Here, the asserted patents identified only three exemplary irreversible EGFR inhibitors, yet the trial evidence showed that at least two – and potentially all three – could not be administered at any dosage within the disclosed dosage ranges without exceeding maximum tolerated human doses. The preferred embodiments therefore undermined, rather than supported, enablement by showing that the specification did not teach how to practice the claimed invention across its full scope.

Finally, the panel insisted that the decision does not establish a new requirement that method-of-treatment patents include clinical safety or efficacy data. The panel reaffirmed that enablement is distinct from FDA approval and consistent with its prior decision in United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74 F.4th 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that treating pulmonary hypertension did not import additional safety or efficacy requirements into the claims because those limitations were not recited). Wyeth instead illustrates the other side of that principle: when claims expressly require a particular dosing regimen, the specification must enable that regimen across the full scope of the claims. Here, evidence of inoperative or toxic embodiments mattered because it showed that the specification did not provide sufficient guidance to identify workable dosages without undue experimentation.  The broader lesson extends beyond dosing: claim amendments made to overcome prior art can create new § 112 vulnerabilities, including enablement, written description, and indefiniteness. Wyeth underscores the importance of reassessing § 112 support whenever claims are amended to ensure the amended claims remain supported by the specification.

Takeaways for Practitioners

For patent prosecutors in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, Wyeth v. AstraZeneca establishes that in vitro assays and broad mechanistic disclosures cannot bridge a clinical gap when a method claim includes an in vivo administration limitation. Whenever a claim recites explicit dosing, whether through a numerical range or functional terminology like a “unit dosage” tied to a therapeutic effect, the specification must provide concrete dosing guidance, or explicit translational modeling, to enable a safe and effective human dosing regimen. While disclosing or claiming broad dosing ranges is predicted to maximize nominal claim scope, doing so introduces severe § 112 vulnerability if the disclosures and in vitro data fail to share nexus with the ultimately determined in vivo results in humans.

Conversely, Teva v. Eli Lilly illustrates that when claiming a method of using a genus of molecules or biologics whose production and binding mechanics are already well-known and routine in the art, patent applicants do not need to provide data for every member of the claimed genus. During litigation, objective statements by others and admissions by challengers acknowledging that the claimed class of compounds was well-known and routine to produce and use can be crucial evidence supporting enablement.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.


[1] Slip op. at 2–3.

[2] Slip op. at 3.

[3] Slip op. at 3–4, 14.

[4] Slip op. at 4.

[5] Slip op. at 5.

[6] Slip op. at 6–7

[7] Slip op. at 10–11.

[8] Id.

[9] Slip op. at 13

[10] Slip op. at 14

[11] Slip op. at 14.

[12] Slip op. at 15–16 (evidence showed that, for those two compounds, all therapeutically effective dosage levels across the disclosed range exceeded the maximally tolerated dose in humans).

[13] Slip op. at 18.

[14] Id.

[15] Slip op. at 19 (citing United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74 F.4th 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2023)).

[16] Slip op. at 19.

[17] Slip op. at 14.

The pharmaceutical industry has been watching Hikma Pharmaceutical USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. (No. 24-889) closely for its potentially sweeping implications for generic drug competition, as discussed in our prior posts – Supreme Court to Address ‘Skinny Label’ Patent Disputes and Supreme Court Hears Skinny Label Arguments in Hikma v. Amarin, Signaling Impact on Hatch-Waxman Carve-Out Strategy. On June 4, 2026, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Jackson, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit and held that Amarin failed to plausibly allege that Hikma actively induced infringement of Vascepa’s patented cardiovascular indication through its skinny label, website, patient leaflet, and press releases. The skinny-label carve-out pathway – and the generic industry’s ability to rely on it – emerged intact. The decision builds directly on post-GSK v. Teva1 discussions while adding critical nuance on pleading standards and the limits of “totality of the circumstances” theories.

Brief Recap

Amarin developed Vascepa® (icosapent ethyl), which received FDA approval for severe hypertriglyceridemia (the “SH indication”) in 2012 and, following a landmark $300 million clinical trial, for a second cardiovascular risk reduction indication (the “CV indication”) in 2019 – the latter still covered by in-force patents. Hikma launched a generic version in 2020 under a skinny label approved only for the SH indication, carving out the patented CV indication as permitted under the Hatch-Waxman Section viii framework. Amarin nonetheless sued, alleging that the combination of Hikma’s label, website statements, and press releases – including references to the product as a “generic version of Vascepa®” and citation to Vascepa’s full revenue figures – plausibly established that Hikma had actively encouraged physicians to prescribe the generic for the patented CV use.

Amarin reported Vascepa® sales revenue numbers as follows in its SEC filings:

  • 2019: ~$427.4 million (product revenue, net)
  • 2020: $607.0 million (product revenue, net; record year)
    • Hikma launched generic version Nov. 2020
  • 2021: $580.3 million (product revenue, net)
    • Dr. Reddy’s launched generic version June 2021
  • 2022: $366.5 million (product revenue, net)
    • Apotex and Teva launched generic versions in 2022
  • 2023: $285.3 million (product revenue, net)2
  • 2024: $204.6 million (product revenue, net)
  • 2025: ~$182.8 million (product revenue, net)

The District Court granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, explaining that none of the alleged statements constituted active steps to encourage infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed it in 2024, finding it “at least plausible that a physician could read” the label, website, and press releases “as an instruction or encouragement to prescribe [Hikma’s generic] for any of the approved uses of icosapent ethyl.”3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments on April 29, 2026.

The Decision

The Court framed the key question as follows: “The central question is whether Amarin plausibly alleged that Hikma actively encouraged infringing uses, not merely whether doctors could plausibly read the alleged statements as instructions to infringe.”4

The framing captures where the Federal Circuit went wrong. The appellate court had focused on the receiver’s possible interpretation – what a physician could read into Hikma’s communications. The Supreme Court redirected the inquiry to the sender’s affirmative conduct: did Hikma take active steps to encourage infringement?

The Legal Framework

The Court reaffirmed that a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)5 requires three elements (1) direct infringement by a third party; (2) knowledge that the induced acts constitute infringement; and (3) “active steps” to encourage that direct infringement.6 The opinion focused on the third element, relying on its prior trio of inducement cases – Grokster7, Global-Tech8, and Limelight9 – to define what “active steps” actually means.

The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s focus: whether physicians could plausibly read statements as encouragement. Instead, the Court emphasized that active steps require “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,” as opposed to “ordinary acts incident to product distribution.”10 Critically, the Court denied “mere omissions, inactions, or nonfeasance” as bases to allege active inducement.11

Applying the Standard

Working through Amarin’s allegations category-by-category, the Court found each unpersuasive.

The skinny label itself. The Federal Circuit gave meaningful weight to the fact that Hikma’s label retained information about a clinical study. The Supreme Court dismissed this: “[B]y statute, Hikma’s label must be identical to Amarin’s except for carved-out uses.”12 Compliance with a federal labeling mandate cannot, without more, constitute an affirmative step to induce infringement.

Describing the product as a “generic equivalent.” The Court observed that identifying a product as the generic version of its reference listed drug is “normal industry practice” to “truthfully describe” a generic drug as “‘equivalent’” to the brand-name comparator under the ANDA framework.13 In fact, demonstrating bioequivalence is the very basis on which generic drugs obtain FDA approval. Characterizing standard regulatory language as evidence of inducement would effectively penalize generic manufacturers for complying with the abbreviated approval pathway Congress created.

Omissions. Amarin argued that Hikma’s press releases failed to note that the approved use was limited to the less-known SH indication. The Court rejected this theory, holding that because inducement requires affirmative “statements or actions,” Amarin “may not rely on ‘mere omissions, inactions, or nonfeasance’” to carry its pleading burden.14

The patient information leaflet. The leaflet referenced side effects for individuals with cardiovascular disease and included a general disclaimer that medicines may be prescribed for purposes other than those listed. The Court found these to be “implausibly roundabout ways to induce medical providers to infringe,” far removed from the affirmative encouragement required for inducement under § 271(b).15

Website descriptions and AB rating. Describing the therapeutic category as “hypertriglyceridemia” and noting the drug’s “AB” rating, which indicates that it is therapeutically equivalent to Vascepa when used according to its labeling, “do not plausibly constitute statements designed to ‘stimulate others to commit’ infringement” – particularly where, as here, Hikma’s own website expressly disclaimed that its generic is approved for fewer than all of Vascepa’s indications.16

Press release sales figures. The Court characterized Amarin’s allegation that Hikma’s press releases referenced Vascepa’s sales figures, including those attributable to the patented CV indication, as speculation that such statements, which seemed aimed at investors, could somehow encourage doctors and pharmacists to use its generic for the patented cardiovascular indication. The Court observed that drawing an inference of inducement from these figures requires “a ‘possible’ but not ‘plausible’ chain of events” – the precise threshold between possibility and plausibility that lies at the heart of Iqbal and Twombly.17

The Court reversed the Federal Circuit and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

What the Decision Means for Generics

The ruling is a significant win for generic manufacturers and strengthens the skinny-label framework. The Court did not create a categorical exemption from induced infringement for skinny-label generics — liability under § 271(b) remains available where a manufacturer takes affirmative steps to encourage infringing use. But the decision draws a meaningful line between conduct that crosses into active inducement and the ordinary, FDA-mandated, and commercially oriented communications that accompany a generic launch.

For generics contemplating a Section viii carve-out, several practical takeaways emerge:

  • FDA compliance does not immunize a manufacturer from liability, but it is not a basis for liability either. The Court was unwilling to treat federally mandated label content as evidence of infringing intent. Generic manufacturers that operate within the scope of their skinny label approval are not, by that fact alone, exposing themselves to inducement liability.
  • Routine commercial language describing a product as a “generic equivalent” of its reference listed drug will not, without more, support an inducement claim. The ANDA framework is built on bioequivalence — Hikma’s description of its product as a generic version of Vascepa® was, as the Court recognized, a factually accurate description of its regulatory status.
  • Omissions are not affirmative steps. The argument that a generic company must affirmatively call out the limits of its approved indication in every communication — or else risk liability for not doing so — is foreclosed by the Court’s decision. Liability under § 271(b) requires action that encourages infringement, not failure to repeat the boundaries of an FDA-approved skinny label.
  • Vague or speculative chains of inference will not survive a motion to dismiss. The pleading standard under Iqbal18 Twombly19 remains in effect, and Amarin’s attempt to weave a plausible inducement story from product descriptions, sales data, and leaflet language failed to meet it.

The decision should not be read, however, as a green light for careless communication in skinny-label contexts. The Court left open what might constitute active encouragement — and a manufacturer that, for example, explicitly markets its drug to prescribers for a carved-out use, or takes promotional steps directed at the patented indication, would face a very different factual record.

Generics should be careful to 1) adhere to FDA-compliant skinny labels and avoid promotional materials that could be seen as designed to drive the patented use, 2) audit websites, sales training, and responses to medical inquiries for anything beyond neutral facts, 3) be vigilant about product naming/positioning, and 4) train sales and communications personnel against making suggestive statements to physicians.

What the Decision Means for Brands

For branded manufacturers who have invested substantially in developing new indications for existing drugs, the ruling is a setback — but not a total one. Amarin’s position was a compelling one: it spent $300 million to demonstrate that icosapent ethyl reduces cardiovascular events, generated substantial revenue tied to indication-specific sales, and watched a competitor launch a generic that, as the Court acknowledged, would predictably be prescribed off-label for the patented use under state generic-substitution laws.

The Court’s response to that equitable concern was essentially structural rather than legal. The Hatch-Waxman framework, by design, creates this tension, and deliberately balances incentives for pharmaceutical innovation against the goal of timely generic competition. As the Court noted, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have generic substitution laws that permit or require substitution of an AB-rated generic regardless of indication. As a result, off-label use of a skinny-label generic was not merely foreseeable, it was legislatively enabled. However, that dynamic alone does not create § 271(b) liability.

Brands contemplating suing skinny label generic makers will need to think carefully about how to structure their evidence. The decision suggests that brands can still bring viable inducement claims where they can point to genuinely affirmative conduct — promotional materials targeted at a carved-out use, direct communications encouraging physicians to prescribe for the patented indication, implicit suggestions via naming/positioning that go beyond routine equivalence, or other conduct that goes beyond the FDA-mandated labeling and ordinary commercial practices.

The more difficult question — one the Court did not fully answer — is what affirmative conduct, if any, would be sufficient in practice when a generic manufacturer otherwise adheres to an FDA-approved skinny label.  The ruling explicitly notes that implicit encouragement can qualify if “clear to the relevant audience and affirmative” (e.g., suggestive naming in Grokster).

That question is likely to shape the next generation of inducement litigation in the pharmaceutical space.

The decision may also increase lobbying for legislative solutions. Existing proposals such as the Skinny Labels, Big Savings Act seek to further clarify and strengthen protections for Section viii carve-outs. After this decision, innovators will likely feel that the existing framework does not adequately protect the substantial investments required to develop and clinically validate new indications for existing drugs.

Implications for the Biosimilar Context

As noted in our prior posts, Hikma v. Amarin arises under Hatch-Waxman, but its logic is expected to carry over to biosimilar products as well. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) provides an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars and a structured framework for resolving patent disputes between biosimilar sponsors and reference product sponsors. Where a biosimilar is approved for a subset of the reference product’s indications, the breadth of the inducement standard will shape how parties assess the risk of launch communications, indication-specific labeling strategies, and promotional conduct. The Court’s emphasis on affirmative steps — and its rejection of omission-based and inference-based theories — provides useful guidance for biosimilar manufacturers navigating similar carve-out decisions.

Looking Ahead

Hikma v. Amarin is now the leading case on induced infringement in the skinny-label context, and the unanimous opinion provides the clearest articulation of what § 271(b) does and does not require in this setting. The Court’s framework — focusing on the defendant’s affirmative conduct rather than the recipient’s possible interpretation — will guide lower court analysis going forward and shape the risk calculus for both brand and generic manufacturers in future disputes.

The decision also serves as a reminder of the deliberate balance Congress struck in the Hatch-Waxman Act: a system designed to bring generics to market sooner, preserve patent protection for genuinely new uses, and resolve disputes through a defined legal process. We will continue to monitor further developments arising from this decision and its implications across the pharmaceutical and biologics space.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.        


  1. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 7 F. 4th 1320 (2021). ↩︎
  2. Since 2023, the FDA has approved at least seven other generic versions. ↩︎
  3. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. Hikma Pharms. USA Inc.,104 F. 4th 1370, 1378-80 (Fed. Cir. 2024). ↩︎
  4. Slip op. at 2. ↩︎
  5. “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” ↩︎
  6. Slip op. at 2. ↩︎
  7. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). ↩︎
  8. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011). ↩︎
  9. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 572 U. S. 915 (2014). ↩︎
  10. Slip op. at 2. ↩︎
  11. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  12. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  13. Id. at .11 ↩︎
  14. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  15. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  16. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  17. Id. at 3. ↩︎
  18. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009). ↩︎
  19. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007). ↩︎

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026, in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. (No. 24-889), the closely watched skinny-label case for which the Court granted certiorari earlier this year. As discussed in our prior post, Supreme Court to Address ‘Skinny Label’ Patent Dispute,the case has significant implications for generic manufacturers navigating carve-out labeling strategies under Hatch-Waxman.

The case marks the Supreme Court’s first patent matter since Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi and could substantially affect how courts evaluate induced infringement claims involving skinny labels.

Brief Recap of the Dispute

Amarin is the maker of Vascepa® (icosapent ethyl), a drug originally approved to treat severe hypertriglyceridemia (very high triglycerides). Amarin later invested approximately $300 million in the landmark REDUCE-IT clinical trial, which demonstrated that Vascepa® also reduces the risk of cardiovascular events — a blockbuster new indication that generated over a billion dollars in sales. Amarin obtained later-expiring method-of-use patents covering this cardiovascular indication.

The dispute arises from Hikma’s generic version of Vascepa®. Hikma launched its product with an FDA-approved skinny label that carved out Amarin’s patented cardiovascular indication while retaining approval for severe hypertriglyceridemia.

Amarin nevertheless alleged that Hikma induced infringement of its patents through certain public statements and marketing materials that allegedly encouraged physicians to prescribe the product for the patented cardiovascular use. In particular, Amarin pointed to Hikma press releases referring to the product as a “generic version of Vascepa” and referencing Vascepa’s overall sales figures, including sales associated with the patented cardiovascular indication.

Although the district court dismissed the claims, the Federal Circuit revived the case in 2024, concluding that Amarin plausibly alleged induced infringement when considering Hikma’s labeling and related statements together. Hikma petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s approach threatens the viability of the Section viii carve-out framework and creates uncertainty for generic manufacturers relying on skinny labels.

Oral Argument Focused on Limits of Induced Infringement

The April 29, 2026, oral arguments brought into focus how far inducement liability can extend when a generic drug is launched under a Section viii “skinny label” carve-out. The Court heard from Hikma, Amarin, and the United States, which appeared as amicus curiae supporting Hikma (the petitioner) and was allotted separate argument time given the case’s implications for the federal Hatch-Waxman framework.

During the hearing, the Justices appeared focused on identifying an appropriate standard that balances inducement liability with Congress’ intent to permit carved-out labels for unpatented uses under the Hatch-Waxman framework. Several members of the Court questioned whether allowing liability based on combination of labeling and surrounding communications risk undermining the statutory safe space created by the skinny-label pathway, particularly given the significant cost savings associated with generic drugs. The Court also appeared concerned with an appropriate evidentiary threshold for inducement liability, including whether generalized marketing references and routine commercial communications are sufficient to establish liability or whether more specific proof of encouragement is required.

Hikma contended that inducement requires clear, affirmative encouragement of infringing use, not inferences drawn from FDA-compliant labeling or routine marketing. It emphasized that the Section viii framework is designed to preserve lawful non-patented uses and cautioned that treating ordinary FDA-compliant marketing language as evidence of intent to induce infringement would effectively undermine the statutory-carve out.  Hikma painted a stark picture of the consequences, arguing that under the Federal Circuit’s decision, a generic can get FDA approval of a skinny product label that is required by statute to mirror the brand’s label, but as soon as the product is commercialized and described as a generic version, even with disclaimers, it creates infringement liability. Hikma pointed to a prior case involving GSK and Teva where “Teva got hit for hundreds of millions of dollars that dwarfed its actual profits.”

The United States largely agreed with Hikma, stressing that a skinny label is federally mandated and therefore cannot, by itself, support an inference of inducement. Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm L. Stewart argued that the Federal Circuit erred by giving weight to FDA-required labeling or regulatory compliance, cautioning that this approach risks converting lawful conduct into evidence of liability. He further warned that an inference-based standard could deter generic entry by exposing manufacturers to inducement claims despite staying within FDA approval, thereby undermining the Hatch-Waxman scheme threatening the availability of lower-cost generic drugs.  Stewart emphasized a foundational principle: “It’s a bedrock principle of inducement law that active inducement to infringe is required. The question is not whether the defendant has adequately warned people away from infringement.”  Stewart also explained — in response to questioning from Justice Jackson on why describing a product as “the generic version of Vascepa” is innocuous: “Under the abbreviated new drug application process, the generic comes on the market not by conducting independent studies of safety and efficacy but by showing that it is equivalent to a drug that’s already been found safe and efficacious. And so, when Hikma says we’re the generic version of Vascepa, they just mean Vascepa is what’s called the reference listed drug.”  Responding to questions about broader market implications, Stewart posited that “we certainly think that if the Federal Circuit’s analysis were affirmed, that it would create a substantial disincentive to entering the generic market.”

Amarin countered that inducement can be shown through circumstantial evidence, especially at the pleading stage. It argued that Hikma’s references to Vascepa®, along with marketing language suggesting interchangeability and highlighting full-market potential, plausibly encouraged physicians to prescribe the generic for the still-patented indication. In Amarin’s view, FDA compliance does not shield a manufacturer where broader promotional conduct allegedly encourages infringing use. Amarin argued that: “If a branded drug like Amarin cannot get any kind of protection for a newly discovered use of its existing drug, it would just be economically irrational to make that kind of investment that discovers a lifesaving cure. And I think that’s what we are really fighting for in this case, is the opportunity to say: We spent five years, we spent $300 million, and we discovered something that is literally saving people’s lives. Hikma wants to come and, having spent no money basically at all, try to capture all of those gains.”  In response to Congressman Waxman’s amicus brief stating that “the Federal Circuit’s decision threatens to decimate the compromise at the heart of the Hatch-Waxman Act” and that “generics have saved 3.4 trillion over the past 10 years, but the Federal Circuit’s decision here leaves generic drug companies in the dark about what might expose them to liability.” Hikma responded by emphasizing that the other side of the Hatch-Waxman compromise was “about protecting the need to encourage branded drugs to take existing products and invest massive resources to discover how those drugs can be used for new cures.”

Implications for Generic Competition Framework and Beyond

Although the Hikma v. Amarin arises under Hatch-Waxman, the Court’s decision could influence how courts evaluate induced infringement claims involving carved-out indications across the pharmaceutical sector. A broader inducement standard could increase litigation exposure for manufacturers that rely on skinny labels to enter markets with partially patented products. This risk may be particularly serious where allegations rely on a combination of FDA-approved labeling and non-label communications such as press releases or product descriptions. Conversely, a narrower standard could reinforce the predictability of the Section viii carve-out mechanism and preserve its role as a key pathway for earlier generic entry.

Similar issues may also emerge in the biologics context under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA), which not only provide an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars but also creates a defined process for resolving patent disputes between biosimilar sponsors and reference product sponsors. In particular, the breadth of the inducement standard may influence how courts assess biosimilar launch communications and indication-specific labeling strategies in infringement disputes.

Looking Ahead

The most contentious factual question is whether repeatedly calling a product “generic Vascepa” at a time when Vascepa® was famous for its cardiovascular benefits — plausibly constitutes active encouragement of the patented use, or whether it is merely an accurate product description (reference listed drug identification) with an obvious non-infringing explanation.

Procedural issues also loom if the Supreme Court were to remand, e.g., whether to vacate the Federal Circuit’s opinion and remand to the Federal Circuit, which would remand it to the district court to permit Amarin to amend its complaint, or because the dismissal was with prejudice and Amarin conceded to that judgment, that any remand would leave only a Rule 60 motion, essentially declaring the case over save for exceptional circumstances.

A decision is expected later this Term, and the Court’s ruling could become a defining precedent for induced infringement in the pharmaceutical context. Regardless of outcome, Hikma v. Amarin is likely to be one of the most consequential pharmaceutical patent decisions in recent years, particularly for manufacturers navigating the intersection of FDA labeling pathways and patent enforcement strategies. We will continue to monitor further developments relating to this case and provide an update when the Court issues its decision.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.           

Recent decisions across the Federal Circuit and district courts reflect a tightening approach to approximation in patent claims. In Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc. v. Safe Foods Corp., the Federal Circuit invalidated claims where “about” lacked objective boundaries. Enviro Tech Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Safe Foods Corp., No. 2024-2160, 2026 WL 1204374 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2026). In Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., removal of “about” during prosecution triggered estoppel and foreclosed reliance on the doctrine of equivalents. Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00252-JDW, 2026 WL 266389 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026). And in Fennec Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Cipla Ltd., even an expressly defined “about” required expert interpretation at claim construction. No. 2:23-cv-00123 (D.N.J. July 14, 2025). The unifying takeaway is not necessarily that “about” is per se improper. Instead, these decisions collectively demonstrate that use of “about” may create downstream risk and should be carefully considered with advice from patent prosecution counsel.

Enviro Tech: Indefiniteness Where “About” Lacks Coherent Boundaries

In Enviro Tech, the Federal Circuit affirmed invalidity of claims reciting a pH “of about 7.6 to about 10.” The court reiterated that terms of degree are permissible only where the intrinsic record provides a reasonably certain boundary, and that the applicant’s “treatment of the word ‘about’ during the patent’s prosecution … fails to inform a skilled artisan of claim 1’s scope with reasonable certainty.” Enviro Tech Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Safe Foods Corp., No. 2024-2160, 2026 WL 1204374, at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2026). The court noted that claims at issue were silent as to tolerance. Id. (“[T]he claims do not provide any guidance on how much below a pH of 7.6 or above a pH of 10 the peracetic acid-containing water can be to meet the limitation.”). The specification provided conflicting guidance, with some examples suggesting ±0.3 pH units and others tolerating deviations up to 0.5 pH units. Id. at 5. The prosecution history offered no clarification; indeed, “Enviro Tech treated the term inconsistently, suggesting that it was material to some claims and immaterial to others.” Id.

Against a backdrop of prior art at pH 7.0, the court required precision that the term “about” did not supply. The court concluded that “[w]hen the specification recites pHs of 6–10, and the prior art pH of 7.0 required the claims to be amended, the definiteness requirement of § 112 necessitates much more clarity than using the vague term ‘about.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Enviro Tech may reflect increased scrutiny where “about” is used in close proximity to prior art without a clear and consistent definition.

Arbutus: Removing “About” and the Resulting Prosecution History Estoppel

While Enviro Tech reflects the risks associated with using “about” without sufficient definitional support, the recent rulings in Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc. illustrate the consequences of eliminating the term during prosecution. In advance of trial, the District of Delaware held that Arbutus’ amendment during prosecution, which removed “about” from claimed lipid molar ratio ranges, constituted a narrowing amendment that gave rise to prosecution history estoppel and precluded the patentee from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE). Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-00252-JDW, 2026 WL 266389, at *8-10 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026). As a result, Arbutus was limited to proving literal infringement of the asserted claims. Id. at *1.

The practical effect of that ruling is significant. The asserted patents claim lipid nanoparticle formulations defined by specific molar percentage ranges for multiple lipid components.  Because the patentee was limited to literal infringement, even minor deviations in component ratios that fall outside the literal scope of the claims would be held not to infringe. From a drafting and prosecution perspective, Arbutus illustrates that removal of “about” may have consequences beyond simple clarification. Indeed, the court found the applicant’s assertion that the amendment was made “[i]n an earnest effort to expedite prosecution, but without acquiescing on the merits of the rejection” insufficient to obviate the estoppel. See id. at *3. Accordingly, while such amendments may be an expedient way to resolve an Examiner’s indefiniteness concerns or distinguish prior art, they can also operate as a surrender of any tolerance that might otherwise have been captured through equivalence. In technologies where small numerical variations are expected – including pharmaceutical formulations and biologics – such surrender may be dispositive.

Fennec: Even Defined “About” Can Introduce Interpretive Instability

In the District of New Jersey, the claim construction decision in Fennec demonstrates that defining “about” may not resolve all interpretive questions. A pair of pH terms were at issue in Fennec: “a pH between about 6.5 and about 8.9” (’793 Pat.) and “a pH between about 8.6 and 8.8” (’793 Pat.). In each patent, the word “about” is defined as “any values, including both integers and fractional components that are within a variation of up to ±10% of the value modified by the term ‘about,’” though the court noted that neither patent defined “value.” Fennec Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Cipla Ltd., No. 2:23-cv-00123 at 4-5 (D.N.J. July 14, 2025). The case settled shortly thereafter.1

Critically, because pH is measured on a logarithmic scale, the court had to determine whether the ±10% variation applied to the numerical pH value or to the underlying ion concentration. Plaintiff asked the Court to construe the values presented in the claims as logarithmic measurements of the concentrations of hydronium ions (H+) and hydroxide ions (OH–), arguing that, due to the logarithmic nature of the pH scale, a 10% difference in the number of the pH scale measurement does not necessarily represent a 10% difference in the underlying value. Plaintiff accordingly proposed a construction in which the word “about” modifies not simply the number of the pH measurement, but rather the underlying concentration of ions (resulting in a construed pH range of between 8.56 and 8.85). Defendants, in turn, argued that the value modified by the word “about” is simply the face value of the numbers of the pH measurement, which yielded a much broader proposed pH range than Plaintiff’s (e.g., between 7.74 and 9.68 (8.6 – 0.86 = 7.74 and 8.8 + 0.88 = 9.68). Id. at 5 Relying on expert testimony, the court adopted the Plaintiffs’ approach. Specifically, the court found that “given the patents’ silence on the meaning of the word ‘value’ and the importance of that word as it relates to the modifier ‘about’ in the context of the pH scale,” the court needed to rely on extrinsic evidence. Id.

Finding Plaintiff’s expert persuasive, the court found that “the ‘value’ being measured by the pH scale is acidity/basicity, which in turn is a measure of the concentration of H+ and OH- ions” and that “[a]s such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s construction of the pH claims more accurately describes the way a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the meaning of ‘about’ as it pertains to pH values.” Id. at 5-6. The court narrowly construed the “about” term modifying the pH range and adopted Plaintiff’s proposed narrow construction. Id. at 6. This result is notable for its finding that, even with an explicit definition, “about” required technical reinterpretation and extrinsic evidence at claim construction, producing a narrower range than might be assumed from the claim language in view of the specification definition alone.

Synthesis and Practical Implications

Taken together, Enviro Tech, Arbutus, and Fennec highlight relevant considerations for practitioners confronting numerical claim limitations:

  • Use of “about” without consistent and technically grounded support risks indefiniteness or an overbroad construction;
  • Inclusion of an explicit definition in the specification may preserve validity, but can introduce interpretive complexity and potentially narrow or broaden the claims in ways not immediately apparent from the claim language;
  • Removal of “about” during prosecution may foreclose reliance on the doctrine of equivalents and limit enforcement to strict literal scope.

These decisions may suggest that courts expect flexibility introduced by terms such as “about” to be supported by the intrinsic record, while also giving weight to amendments that remove such flexibility during prosecution. For patent attorneys, particularly in fields involving tightly constrained numerical parameters such as biotech and pharma, these cases highlight the importance of considering the relationship between claim language, specification support, and prosecution strategy.

  1. See https://investors.fennecpharma.com/news-releases/news-release-details/fennec-pharmaceuticals-announces-settlement-agreement-resolving. ↩︎

In the competitive pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, where robust patent portfolios are essential for protecting innovative biologics and enabling successful biosimilar development and market entry, securing favorable outcomes at the USPTO is paramount.  Patent allowance rates in pharmaceutical and biotechnology art units reveal that large pharmaceutical companies significantly outperform smaller competitors at the USPTO.

Given the acute importance of patent portfolios to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, we examined allowance rates of utility patent applications within the USPTO Art Units 1600* (covering relevant organic chemistry and biotechnology inventions) from January 2019 to February 2026.  Our analysis, drawn from the USPTO’s publicly available Patent File Wrapper API, focuses on a sample of twelve of the largest pharmaceutical companies by size that are publicly traded in the U.S. and compared their performance with all applicants within the same time window and art units.

FIG. 1: Illustration of average allowance rate of twelve large pharmaceutical company applicants within the 1600* art units from January 2019 to February 2026.

FIG. 2: Comparison of average allowance rate of twelve large pharmaceutical company applicants to all applicants and large entity status applicants within the 1600* art units from January 2019 to February 2026.

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the blue bars depict the average allowance rate for each respective company where the allowance rate is calculated as the number of total allowances divided by the number of total disposed cases (i.e., allowances and abandonments).[1]  In Figure 1, the pharmaceutical companies are ordered from highest (left) to lowest (right) allowance rate.  In Figure 2, the dashed orange line represents the average allowance rate (63%) of large entity status applicants, and the dashed black line represents the average allowance rate (61%) of all applicants.  Many of these top pharmaceutical companies exceed the average allowance rate of all applicants and even surpass the large entity average.  The average allowance rate of the twelve sampled large pharmaceutical companies was 70%.

These results show that most large pharmaceutical companies significantly outperform smaller pharmaceutical and biotechnology patent applicants regarding application allowances.  Interestingly, the large pharma average allowance rate is skewed downwards by significantly below average allowance rates of 57% and 59% by Johnson & Johnson and Roche, respectively.  Overall, the large pharma group’s average allowance rate is notably higher than the 61% average for all applicants and the 63% average for all large entities, which includes the sampled large pharma companies, within the same art units and time period.

A recent analysis comparing the prosecution outcomes of applicants based on their entity status found that large entities (e.g., businesses with greater than 500 employees) significantly outperformed small and micro entities [1].  The analysis considered utility patent applications disposed during January 2026.  Our analysis further highlights the outperformance of large pharmaceutical companies compared to smaller competitors.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.


[1] Data available at https://api.uspto.gov/api/v1/patent/applications/search via the Patent File Wrapper API, and collected using a bespoke MATLAB script.

In a recent order, USPTO Director John A. Squires convened the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Appeals Review Panel (ARP) and granted sua sponte rehearing in an ex parte appeal involving obviousness-type double patenting (OTDP). The ARP will review the PTAB’s prior reversal of OTDP rejections as to claims 1-18 of Application No. 17/135,529. See Ex parte Baurin Appeal No. 2024-002920 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2026) (ARP Order). The ARP order sets a single near-term deadline for (i) an appellant OTDP-only brief (≤10 pages) and (ii) amicus briefs (≤10 pages), both due March 27, 2026. See id.

The ARP has identified three topics for focused briefing:

  1. How (if at all) Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Laboratories applies, including what “first-filed” means for OTDP purposes on facts that differ from Allergan;
  2. Whether examiners should determine projected expiration dates to support OTDP rejections during prosecution; and
  3. Whether concerns about separate ownership/potential harassment can serve as an independent basis supporting OTDP rejections during prosecution.

PTAB Decision of November 8, 2024

In its Decision on Appeal, the PTAB reversed multiple OTDP rejections of claims 1-18. The ARP rehearing is limited to the Board’s reversal of the OTDP rejections and the issues identified in the ARP Order.

The patents cited in the double patenting rejections were later filed and would expire later than the application on appeal, particularly in view of terminal disclaimers filed in the appealed application. The Decision noted that, “in view of the terminal disclaimers,” any patent issuing from the appealed application could not extend beyond March 28, 2032, while the asserted reference patent terms extended later.

In reversing the rejections, the Board discussed Federal Circuit OTDP decisions (such as Gilead and AbbVie) addressing how “first” and “second” patents can be framed in a post-URAA environment and cited Allergan in describing OTDP’s purpose of preventing a patentee from obtaining a “second patent” to extend exclusivity on patentably indistinct subject matter. The Board acknowledged the facts differed from Allergan (including that Allergan involved patents sharing a common priority date), but nevertheless found aspects of Allergan’s reasoning compelling in the posture presented.

The Board also addressed the examiner’s “separate ownership” point. In the Board’s view, once it concluded the applied reference could not serve as a proper OTDP reference under its reasoning, arguments about the risk of separate ownership were immaterial to the outcome.

The Examiner’s Rehearing Request (and the Board’s Denial)

Following the PTAB’s November 2024 decision, the examiner’s supervisor, Julie Wu (Supervisory Patent Examiner in Art Unit 1643) filed a Request for Rehearing (under MPEP § 1214.04). Request for Rehearing by Examiner Under MPEP § 1214.04, Ex parte Baurin, Appeal No. 2024-002920, at 1 (P.T.A.B.) (requesting rehearing of the Nov. 8, 2024 decision and stating the Board “did not articulate an error with the Examiner’s determination that, under the one-way test, the claims on appeal are not patentably distinct”).

On December 18, 2025, the Board issued a Decision on Request for Rehearing and denied the rehearing request. Decision on Request for Rehearing, Ex parte Baurin, Appeal No. 2024-002920, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2025) (“We DENY the Examiner’s requested relief.”). The rehearing decision was issued by a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs), and included a dissent by one of the APJs, expressing agreement with all but one of the Examiner’s reasons.  The dissenting APJ had replaced one of the three APJs that had rendered the November 2024 decision.

In denying rehearing, the Board addressed issues that track the ARP’s three questions, including how Allergan should be applied in this posture (if there can be no extension of patent term, then a patent is not a proper OTDP reference), how term and expiration relate to OTDP during prosecution (must follow Federal Circuit precedent and identify a proper OTDP reference by comparing effective filing dates and expiration dates), and the role of separate ownership concerns (not an independent basis for making an OTDP rejection).

Relevant Federal Circuit Case Law

Because the ARP’s order expressly requests briefing on Allergan, it is likely to be a central reference point in the ARP’s analysis. In Allergan, the Federal Circuit addressed OTDP in a common-priority fact pattern and held that a first-filed, first-issued, later-expiring claim cannot be invalidated by later-filed, later-issued, earlier-expiring reference claims sharing the same priority date. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs. Priv. Ltd., 111 F.4th 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2024).

Allergan’s discussion of filing sequence and expiration dates provides context for the ARP’s first question, what “first filed” means on different facts, and its second question, whether and how projected expiration dates should be considered during prosecution. The Federal Circuit explained that, after the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), “a patent’s term is now measured from its effective filing, or priority, date,” and that patents sharing a priority date “are expected to expire on the same day.” Id. at 1367-68 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)). The court then noted that a common priority date “does not always guarantee a common expiration date,” because PTA can cause two commonly owned patents that otherwise would expire on the same day to have different expiration dates. Id. at 1368 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(b); AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Tr., 764 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The opinion further explains that, where patentably indistinct inventions have different expiration dates due to PTA, any OTDP concern is “commonly obviated” during prosecution by filing a terminal disclaimer that ties the later-filed application’s expiration and ownership to the earlier-filed application. Id. (citing Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see also id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B)).

For the ARP’s second question, whether examiners should determine projected expiration dates in prosecution, another Federal Circuit decision frequently cited in the OTDP/PTA landscape is In re Cellect. In re Cellect, LLC, 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

Cellect held that, for OTDP purposes, the relevant expiration date for a PTA-adjusted patent is the expiration date after PTA is added. In re Cellect, LLC, 81 F.4th 1216, 1226-27 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding “the expiration date used for an ODP analysis where a patent has received PTA is the expiration date after the PTA has been added”). The court explained that an OTDP determination requires identifying the “later-expiring patent,” which is why “the date when PTA or PTE is applied matters,” and it held that PTA and PTE should be treated differently in OTDP analyses. Id. at 1226. The opinion also describes OTDP’s equitable rationales to include preventing “an improper timewise extension of a patent term” and preventing “split ownership of related patents and subsequent potential harassment by multiple owners or assignees.” Id. at 1221. These points relate directly to the ARP’s third question, which asks whether separate ownership and anti-harassment concerns can independently support an OTDP rejection during prosecution. In addressing those concerns, the court agreed with the Board that a “risk of separate ownership existed” and that a terminal disclaimer would have been required to ensure common ownership, notwithstanding Cellect’s representation that it would not transfer the patents. Id. at 1230. Finally, the court rejected the notion that OTDP can be cured after expiration, stating that “invalidating only the [PTA] adjustment would be tantamount to granting a retroactive terminal disclaimer” and that “[a] terminal disclaimer is not an escape hatch to be deployed after a patent expires.” Id. at 1231.

Requisite Level of Analysis for OTDP Rejections

A related issue in OTDP rejections is how much analysis must appear in the record to support an OTDP rejection, especially where claim differences exist and patentable distinctness is contested.

MPEP 804(II)(B) requires that “the examiner should first construe the claim(s) in the application under examination and the claim(s) in the reference application or patent to determine what are the differences. Then the examiner should determine whether those differences render the claims patentably distinct using an anticipation analysis and/or an obviousness analysis.”  (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1363, 86 USPQ2d 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 

The MPEP states that the following factual inquiries must be performed by the Examiner:

(A) Determine the scope and content of a patent claim relative to a claim in the application at issue;

(B) Determine the differences between the scope and content of the patent claim as determined in (A) and the claim in the application at issue;

(C) Determine the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and

(D) Evaluate any objective indicia of nonobviousness.

Any nonstatutory double patenting rejection made under the obviousness analysis should make clear:

(A) The differences between the inventions defined by the conflicting claims — a claim in the patent compared to a claim in the application; and

(B) The reasons why a person of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that the invention defined in the claim at issue would have been an obvious variation of the invention defined in a claim in the patent.

MPEP § 804(II)(B)(2). 

In Ex parte Mobile Tech, Inc., the Board addressed the sufficiency of an OTDP “record,” explaining that the examiner’s OTDP rejection (in that reexamination) “consists solely of tables” and that “there is no accompanying explanation or analysis.” Ex parte Mobile Tech, Inc., Appeal No. 2022-001034, at 6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2022). The Board emphasized that this was “problematic particularly where . . . there are differences between the claims, differences that demand an explanation why they are not patentably distinct to render the claims obvious variations of each other.” Id.

What to Watch Next

We are closely monitoring developments in regard to this Order and will continue to provide updates.  Given the framing of the three questions, the intent appears to be for the ARP to find that the Baurin decision is distinguishable from Allergan, that it would be unworkable for examiners to project expiration dates, and that the separate ownership prong has never been held to be not support a OTDP rejection on its own.  Applicants would still get Allergan-style protection inside a single patent family, but other commonly owned later-filed, later-expiring references would remain viable OTDP references.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.

On February 27, 2026, Genentech filed a complaint at the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that Biocon’s importation of its pertuzumab biosimilar, BMAB 1500/PERT-IJS (“BMAB 1500”), violates 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“Section 337”). Biocon’s Biologics License Application (“BLA”) for BMAB 1500 references Genentech’s PERJETA (pertuzumab), a HER2-directed monoclonal antibody therapy used in treatment of HER2-positive breast cancer. Genentech seeks a limited exclusion order through expiration of the latest Asserted Patent, cease-and-desist orders to block U.S. importation and related commercial activity, and a bond during the 60-day Presidential Review Period under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j).

The Asserted Patents are: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,652,474 (the ’474 Patent); 11,597,776 (the ’776 Patent); 12,145,997 (the ’997 Patent); and 12,173,080 (the ’080 Patent). The latest expiration date of the Asserted Patents is September 28, 2031 (the ’474 Patent).  The ’474 patent claims pharmaceutical compositions comprising a HER2 antibody and certain acidic variants thereof, and the related ’776 patent claims methods of making such compositions. The ’997 patent and the related ’080 patent claim methods for preventing reduction of disulfide bonds during an antibody manufacturing process. These four patents, along with 20 other patents, were asserted in one prior litigation under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) in district court. That BPCIA litigation was filed by Genentech and Hoffmann-La Roche against Shanghai Henlius Biotech, Shanghai Henlius Biologics, Organon LLC and Organon & Co. (collectively “Henlius”) and involved another pertuzumab biosimilar. The 24 patents asserted in the BPCIA litigation covered various aspects of pertuzumab compositions, formulations, and manufacturing methods. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved Henlius Biotech’s biosimilar (“Poherdy”) in November 2025, and the case settled in January 2026. The terms of the Henlius settlement agreement have not been disclosed.  

Unlike district court litigations, Section 337 investigations are conducted by the ITC pursuant to Section 337 and the Administrative Procedure Act. They involve allegations that importation of specific goods infringes U.S. intellectual property rights. Proceedings include trial before an administrative law judge and subsequent Commission review. The proceedings are faster compared to district court litigations, typically reaching a final decision about 16 months after institution. The principal remedy is an exclusion order directing U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to stop infringing products at the border, although the Commission may also issue cease-and-desist orders. Unlike in district court litigation, the ITC cannot award monetary damages. However, companies can file parallel proceedings at the ITC and in district court.

Here, Genentech alleges that Biocon imported substantial quantities of BMAB 1500 from India before FDA approval, citing an October 18, 2025 shipment of more than 17,800 pieces of BMAB 1500. Genentech contends this conduct falls outside the patent infringement safe harbor under 35 USC 271(e)(1),[i] characterizing it as stockpiling of commercial supplies. Under this logic, Genetech asserts that Biocon’s acts constitute patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)[ii] and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (g),[iii] Genentech challenges patents covering both the product (the ’474 Patent and the ’776 Patent) and its method of production (the ’997 Patent and the ’080 Patent), leveraging the ITC’s expedited timetable to potentially delay a new biosimilar launch in the U.S. market.

[i] Which only protect importation “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”

[ii] Direct infringement triggered by importing the patented invention into the U.S. during the term of the patent.

[iii] Direct infringement triggered by the importation into the U.S. of a product that is made by a process patented in the U.S.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.

On February 6, 2026, the USPTO updated its guidance on anonymous requests for ex parte reexamination. When a patent has previously been the subject of an IPR or PGR that produced a final written decision on at least one claim, an anonymous requester must now include an affirmative statement that the real party in interest is neither the prior petitioner nor a privy of that petitioner.

The change comes on the heels of the surge in ex parte reexamination filings we have seen since the USPTO began expanding discretionary denial authority in IPRs, as discussed here. The updated certification requirement is a direct response to instances where challengers may have sought a second (or third) bite at the apple through anonymous reexams.

For pharmaceutical patent owners, this is a welcome response to the rise in ex parte reexamination filings. Serial challenges, even in different forums, increase litigation risk and uncertainty during the critical pre-launch window. For potential challengers (including biosimilar applicants including collaborators and companies existing in parent-subsidiary or licensor-licensee situations), the updated certification requires careful vetting of real-party-in-interest relationships and will likely discourage some parallel-track strategies.

The message is clear: the post-reform PTAB environment continues to evolve, and sophisticated parties must plan their validity challenges holistically across district court, IPR, PGR, and reexamination avenues.

In the evolving biosimilar landscape, patent challenges remain a critical strategy to clear the path for market entry.  Recent reforms at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) under Director John Squires have significantly altered the inter partes reviews (IPRs) landscape, leading to a steep decline in institution rates.  While this shift may initially appear as a hurdle for biosimilar developers seeking to challenge blocking patents, it opens the door to underutilized alternatives like ex parte reexaminations and it increases the criticality of filing post-grant review (PGR) petitions when the opportunity arises (i.e., within 9-months of patent grant).  Here we explore these changes, their impact on biosimilars specifically, and why reexams could emerge as a strategic tool in biosimilars manufacturers’ toolboxes.

PTAB Reforms and the Decline in IPR Institutions

Director Squires implemented procedural changes aimed at enhancing efficiency of PTAB proceedings.  These changes include centralization of institution decisions under his direct oversight (effective October 2025), proposed rules addressing serial petitions, and real-party-in-interest requirements [1].  These reforms have dramatically decreased IPR institution rates initially.  IPR filings declined to 60.4%  of total PTAB petitions in 2025 (down from 73% in 2024), procedural denials surged 630% (i.e., to a record 607), and institution rates plummeted from 65-82% in the first quarter to 15-34% by the third quarter [2].  See FIG. 1 (illustrating drop in instituted IPRs); see also FIG. 2 (illustrating slight increase in instituted PGRs).  A full review of fiscal year 2025 trial statistics at the PTAB can be found on our PTAB Law Blog.

FIG. 1: Demonstration of IPR filings and institution rates from September 2024 through January 2026.  Data for January 2026 were collected through January 25, 2026.  The blue bars depict the number of IPR filings for each month; the red line depicts the institution rate (%), where the institution rate is calculated from the number of petitions instituted divided by the total number of decisions made (instituted and denied), excluding settlements, terminations, pending petitions, etc.  The trend line shows a downward trend of IPR institution rates.  Appended notes depict important dates.  Data collected January 25, 2026, and are available at https://data.uspto.gov/ptab/trials/proceedings.

FIG. 2: Demonstration of PGR filings and institution rates from September 2024 through January 2026.  Data for January 2026 were collected through January 25, 2026.  The yellow bars depict the number of PGR filings for each month; the blue line depicts the institution rate (%), where the institution rate is calculated from the number of petitions instituted divided by the total number of decisions made (instituted and denied), excluding pending petitions.  The trend line shows a slightly upward trend of PGR institution rates.  Appended notes depict important dates.  Data collected January 25, 2026, and are available at https://data.uspto.gov/ptab/trials/proceedings.

Historically, IPRs have been a favored tool for biosimilar applicants under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), allowing challengers to invalidate key patents efficiently [3, 5].  However, with stricter scrutiny, denials have increased, which may potentially prolong patent disputes and delay biosimilar launches.  Recent analysis suggests that IPR institution rates may be climbing off the recent lows, but the rate remains well below the historical average of roughly 67% [7].

Ex Parte Reexaminations: An Underutilized Avenue for Biosimilar Challengers

Amid these PTAB changes, ex parte reexaminations stand out as a promising, yet underutilized, alternative to IPRs.  Unlike IPRs, which involve adversarial proceedings (albeit with historically high invalidation rates averaging around 60-70%), ex parte reexams are conducted between the patent owner and an examiner, after the reexamination request is filed by a requester.  While the USPTO grants 95% of ex parte reexam requests (vs. 63% institution for IPRs), reexams have lower claim cancellation rates (only 14%) [4].  Approximately 62% of patents that undergo reexamination end up with modified or canceled claims [4].  Filings for ex parte reexams surged 66.1% to 726 in 2025, likely driven by the IPR institution declines [2].  See FIG. 3:

FIG. 3: Demonstration of ex parte reexamination filings from September 2024 through January 2026.  Data for January 2026 were collected through January 25, 2026.  The green bars depict the number of ex parte reexamination filings for each month.  The trend line shows an upward trend of ex parte reexamination filings.  Appended notes depict important dates.  Data collected January 25, 2026, and are available at https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/exparte/analytics.

For biosimilars developers, an ex parte reexam provides several advantages.  The process is cost-effective (i.e., filing fees are around $6,000 vs. $40,000+ for IPRs), anonymous (i.e., no real-party-of-interest disclosure), and flexible, which allows challenges based on printed publications without estoppel risks in subsequent litigation [4].  In biologic patent disputes, where complex formulations and methods are common, ex parte reexams can target narrow invalidity grounds effectively.  Another key benefit is that challenges based on double patenting are allowed, which can be critical for challenging patents that extend pharmaceutical exclusivity.  However, drawbacks include inability to assert enablement (35 U.S.C. § 112) and eligibility (35 U.S.C. § 101) challenges, and no direct interaction with the examiner after filing the request.  Meanwhile, patentees can conduct examiner interviews, submit expert declarations, amend claims, and argue iteratively.   

Proposed ‘one-and-done’ rules could bar subsequent PTAB challenges if a patent is upheld in reexam or court, potentially bulletproofing it from further challenges [6]. We are closely monitoring developments in regard to this proposal and will continue to provide updates.

The uptick of ex parte reexams could represent an adaptation to patent challenge strategy.  Biosimilar applicants can use them strategically to cancel key claims of blocking patents while minimizing costs and avoiding the uncertainty around IPR institutions.  This underutilized tool provides an alternative avenue for challengers to clear patent thickets blocking biosimilar entry.

Impact on the Biosimilars Patent Landscape

Over the years, the biosimilars market has seen robust growth, with PTAB challenges playing a pivotal role in facilitating competition.  For example, in pharmaceutical disputes, IPRs historically achieved high institution rates (around 73%) and contributed to settlements that enabled earlier market entry [3].  Under the new regime, lower IPR institution rates shift most patent challenges to district courts, rather than faster and cheaper resolutions at the PTAB, unless PGRs and ex parte reexaminations can fill the void.  District court litigations can favor patentees, where patents enjoy a presumption of validity and the standard for proving invalidity is clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the PTAB’s lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence and no presumption of validity.

For biosimilar developers, and for challengers in general, the procedural changes signal a directive from the USPTO to severely limit duplicative or late challenges, favoring recently granted patents.  Medical and pharmaceutical petitions, including those for biologics, remained relatively steady at 12.7% of PTAB activity in 2025, indicating sustained interest despite the uncertainty [2].  Challengers may need to adapt strategies, such as focusing on stronger prior art (e.g., airtight, single grounds) to avoid denial or considering the procedural factors likely to impact institution, such as parallel litigation or real-party-in-interest disclosures.

Looking Ahead

While declining IPR institutions may reshape biosimilar strategies, the situation is likely to lead to a rise in ex parte reexaminations as well as PGRs (when available).  Ex parte reexaminations offer an efficient, low-risk alternative that biosimilar developers should consider, particularly when double patenting-based challenges are available.  These proceedings remain viable under the new regime, and provide alternative pathways to clear patents blocking biosimilar entry.

References

1. USPTO Proposes New Institution Rules and Director Takes Over Merits-Based Institution Decisions, Morgan Lewis.  (available at https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2025/10/uspto-proposes-new-institution-rules-and-director-takes-over-merits-based-institution-decisions).

2. Patent Dispute Report: 2025 in Review, Unified Patents.  (available at https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2026/1/13/patent-dispute-report-2025-in-review).

3. Biosimilar Patent Dance: Leveraging PTAB Challenges for Strategic Advantage, Drug Patent Watch.  (available at https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/biosimilar-patent-dance-leveraging-ptab-challenges-for-strategic-advantage/?srsltid=AfmBOopbJSNMW1vtWQXpBWyZmCaOvOLuVZMIDMiZDg53ErL0y3ZRinAs).

4. Ex Parte Reexamination Process, Adibi IP.  (available at https://adibiip.com/ex-parte-reexamination-process/).

5. Cracking the Biosimilar Code: A Deep Dive into Effective IP Strategies, Drug Patent Watch. (available at https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/cracking-the-biosimilar-code-a-deep-dive-into-effective-ip-strategies).

6. The Slow Death of AIA Trials: A Look into the USPTO’s ‘One-and-Done’ Rule Package, IPWatchdog.  (available at https://ipwatchdog.com/2025/12/09/slow-death-aia-trials-one-and-done/).

7. The Thaw Begins?: What’s Driving IPR Institutions Under Director Squires, Patently-O.  (available at https://patentlyo.com/patent/2026/01/driving-institutions-director.html).

Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.