In our September 15, 2026 post, The Evolving Law of Enablement: Federal Circuit Decisions in Wyeth and Teva Form a “Yin and Yang” Framework, we examined how the Federal Circuit reached opposite enablement outcomes in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co. and Wyeth LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, emphasizing the role of the claimed limitations and the state of the art in each case.
The Federal Circuit’s subsequent denial of panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co. leaves intact the panel’s April 2026 decision, Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 172 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2026), holding that Teva’s method-of-treatment claims directed to anti-CGRP antibodies are enabled. But Judge Dyk’s dissent in the denial of rehearing en banc raises a significant question about the scope of the enablement requirement for method claims—and, in particular, whether the panel’s decision creates a potential path around the Supreme Court’s ruling in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023).
The dissent also invokes the Federal Circuit’s decision in Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013), for the principle that a genus may be well known even though the specific embodiments with the desired qualities are not enabled.
Background of Teva: A Method Claim to a Broad Genus
The dispute in Teva concerns two patents directed to methods of treating headache using anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies. Claim 30 of the U.S. Patent No. 8,586,045 was representative. Claim 30, read together with claim 17 from which it depends, recites:
A method for reducing incidence of or treating headache in a human comprising administering to the human an effective amount of an anti-CGRP antagonist antibody, wherein said antagonist is a…humanized monoclonal antibody.
After a jury verdict in Teva’s favor, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Lilly judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement. The district court concluded that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies.
In April 2026, a Federal Circuit panel reversed. With respect to enablement, the panel emphasized the distinction between a claim directed to the antibodies themselves and a claim directed to a “method of using those antibodies to treat headache.” The panel concluded that the relevant inquiry was whether the specification enabled the claimed method of treatment—not whether it enabled the making and use of every antibody falling within the claimed genus for every possible purpose. The panel distinguished Amgen, in which the Supreme Court held that claims directed to a broad genus of PCSK9-blocking antibodies were not enabled across their full scope. Lilly subsequently petitioned for rehearing en banc. On September 30, 2026, the Federal Circuit denied the petition. Judge Dyk was the sole judge to dissent from the denial.
Judge Dyk: The Antibody Remains a Claim Limitation
Judge Dyk’s dissent focuses on what he views as a fundamental flaw in distinguishing Teva from Amgen based on the claim’s characterization as a method of treatment. Even if the method claim is narrower than a claim directed solely to an antibody genus, he argues, the antibody remains an express claim limitation that must itself be enabled:
“Even if [the method claim] were [narrower], the compound still must be enabled since the compound is indisputably a claim limitation.”
Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 24-1094, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2026) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Judge Dyk further explains that “[c]laiming a method of use that depends on a recited component cannot excuse the enablement requirement of the component.” Id.
The disagreement, therefore, concerns whether limiting a claim by therapeutic use sufficiently narrows its scope to satisfy enablement when the claim still encompasses a broad genus of antibodies.
The Amgen Concern: Can a Method Claim Avoid Full-Scope Enablement?
The significance of Judge Dyk’s dissent extends beyond the anti-CGRP antibodies at issue in Teva. His concern is that the panel’s reasoning could allow patentees to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023), by recasting a broad genus claim as a method-of-treatment claim.
In Amgen, the Supreme Court held that claims to antibodies defined by their ability to bind PCSK9 and block its interaction with the LDL receptor were not enabled across their full scope. The Court explained that a specification must enable the full scope of the claimed invention without requiring undue experimentation. Amgen, 598 U.S. at 612–14.
Judge Dyk rejects the panel’s distinction between Amgen and Teva. In Teva, the claims recite a method of treating headache by administering a humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibody. According to Judge Dyk, because the record did not suggest uses for these antibodies other than treating headache, the practical scope of the method claim equals the scope of the antibody genus—and, in any event, the antibody remains a limitation of the claimed method and therefore must itself be enabled across the scope of the claim.
He illustrates the potential problem by observing:
“Had Amgen simply claimed a cholesterol-lowering method using such antibodies, the scope of Amgen’s patent would not have been meaningfully narrowed.”
Teva, at 5 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
He then warns:
“Yet according to the panel opinion in this case, the patentee in Amgen could have evaded the enablement requirement by doing exactly that.”
Id.
Judge Dyk’s point is not that Teva expressly conflicts with Amgen, but that a patentee might obtain substantially the same practical scope that Amgen deemed non-enabled simply by framing the claim as a method of treatment. If the method claim still encompasses essentially the same broad universe of antibodies, changing the claim’s form may not meaningfully reduce the experimentation needed to practice it. Judge Dyk notes that amici characterized the panel opinion as creating an “end-run around Amgen.” Id. (quoting Amicus Br. of Johnson & Johnson and Nagra USA LLC at 10–12).
The Wyeth Comparison: A Known Genus Is Not Necessarily an Enabled Genus
Judge Dyk’s reasoning also brings Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013) into the discussion. In Wyeth, the Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment that claims directed to methods of treating or preventing restenosis using a genus of rapamycin compounds were not enabled. As Judge Dyk describes it, the court concluded that although a class of compounds effective for treatment was known, undisclosed individual species of the claimed genus were not enabled. As Judge Dyk explains:
“It is established that a genus may be well known but the specific embodiments with the desired qualities are not enabled by knowledge of the genus.”
Teva, at 3 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1383–86).
The comparison is significant. In Wyeth, the fact that a class of rapamycin compounds was known did not establish that the full scope of the claimed genus was enabled. Judge Dyk suggests that the same principle should inform the analysis in Teva: the fact that anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies were “well known” as a genus does not answer whether the specific antibody species with antagonist qualities—which, he notes, were not well known—were enabled.
The distinction, therefore, is not simply between a “composition claim” and a “method claim.” Rather, the question is whether the patent enables the full scope of every limitation necessary to practice the claimed invention.
Why the Distinction Between Teva and Amgen Matters
The Federal Circuit panel did not hold that method-of-treatment claims are categorically exempt from the full-scope enablement requirement. Rather, it focused on the particular claims and the evidence concerning the therapeutic use of anti-CGRP antibodies, concluding that the specification sufficiently enabled the claimed method of treating headache.
Judge Dyk’s dissent questions whether that focus adequately addresses the antibody limitation itself. Evidence that the claimed antibodies share a therapeutic function does not necessarily establish that the full antibody genus can be practiced without undue experimentation.
For life sciences patent drafting, the distinction is consequential. Method-of-treatment claims may provide meaningful limits through a specific therapeutic use, but those limits do not necessarily resolve whether a broad genus of molecules recited in the claims is enabled. Judge Dyk’s dissent highlights the continuing tension between claiming a therapeutic application and satisfying the full-scope enablement requirement for the molecules used to carry it out.
What Does Teva Mean for Life Sciences Patent Drafting?
The Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing leaves the panel’s decision intact, but Judge Dyk’s dissent identifies an issue that may continue to arise in future life sciences cases.
The practical question is whether a patentee can obtain broader protection for a genus of therapeutic molecules by claiming the genus through a “method of treatment” rather than through a “composition claim.”
The answer may depend heavily on the particular facts. A method claim may genuinely be narrower than a composition claim where the claimed therapeutic use meaningfully limits the scope of the invention. But Judge Dyk’s dissent suggests that courts should be wary of treating the claim’s format as dispositive where the underlying genus remains broad and the claimed use does not materially narrow the practical scope of the claim.
This distinction is particularly significant for biologics and other therapeutics, where claims often define molecules by their functional rather than structural characteristics. The ability to identify and produce representative members of a genus does not necessarily establish enablement across its full scope. Although evidence of a predictable therapeutic effect may support enablement of a method-of-treatment claim, the question remains whether the specification enables the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.
Looking Ahead
For now, Teva remains precedential Federal Circuit authority. The court’s September 30, 2026 order denying panel rehearing and rehearing en banc leaves intact the panel’s reversal of the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, which reinstated the jury’s verdict of willful infringement and $176.5 million in damages, subject to further proceedings on remand. Lilly has until December 29, 2026, to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, absent an extension.
Whether Teva represents the “end-run around Amgen” that the amici feared may depend less on the panel’s doctrinal framing than on the unusual record behind it. Teva rested on two factual pillars: that anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies were already well known based on Lilly’s own statements to the Patent Office in earlier inter partes review proceedings that such antibodies were “well known in the art,” that humanization was “routine,” and that every humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibody would treat headache, a point Lilly did not dispute on appeal. On that record, the panel treated the antibody genus as a known tool used in the claimed invention, rather than as the invention itself.
The Federal Circuit’s decision two days later in Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Inari Agriculture, Inc., No. 25-1287 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2026) (nonprecedential), illustrates the point. Writing for a panel that included Judge Cunningham and Judge Dyk, Judge Prost, who also authored Teva, affirmed the Board’s holding that all claims of a patent reciting a functionally defined genus of dual herbicide-degrading enzymes were not enabled, including eighteen method-of-controlling-weeds claims. This case did not involve antibodies and the court did not separately analyze the method claims, but Pioneer’s specification described the enzyme as a “highly novel discovery,” placing the genus at the heart of the invention rather than in the background art, and the method claims fell with the composition claims. Pioneer suggests that, at least where the recited genus is itself the inventive contribution, Amgen’s default rule continues to apply to method claims.
A pending appeal may offer the Federal Circuit an opportunity to define Teva’s limits in the antibody context. In OssiFi-Mab LLC v. Amgen Inc., 830 F. Supp. 3d 131 (D. Mass. 2026), the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment that method claims reciting the use of anti-sclerostin antibodies in combination with antiresorptive drugs to treat low bone density were invalid for lack of written description and enablement. The patentee argued that anti-sclerostin antibodies were a class already well known in the prior art, pointing to Amgen’s own earlier patent publication disclosing twenty-eight such antibodies with sequence data, and that it need only show possession of the method of treatment, not the underlying antibodies. The court disagreed, holding that the written description test is the same “whether the claim is to a novel compound or a novel combination of known elements,” and that the specification identified only a handful of antibodies by alphanumeric designation, none with a disclosed sequence and none shown to bind human sclerostin. The court also held that, because skilled artisans would need to “make candidate antibodies and screen them to determine which ones perform the claimed functions,” the claims were not enabled. Notably, the court applied both requirements to claims that recited antibody treatment only in a limiting preamble, reasoning that a contrary rule “would permit a patentee to use a limiting preamble to recite even completely unknown claim limitations.” The court separately held that the specification did not describe the claimed combination methods themselves, which it found had no working examples. The patentee appealed to the Federal Circuit on April 1, 2026.
OssiFi-Mab shares Teva’s method-of-treatment format, but it lacks much of the record that supported the Teva panel’s conclusion. The patentee’s own expert conceded that, without Amgen’s publication, the class could be described as “known” but not necessarily “well known.” The patentee’s experts also agreed that a sclerostin-binding antibody does not necessarily antagonize sclerostin’s function, and the record contained no counterpart to the undisputed Teva finding that every member of the genus performs the claimed use. Most significantly, the district court held that the specification failed to describe the claimed combination methods and was not supported by experiments or working examples. Accordingly, based on the current record, the facts appear distinguishable from Teva.
Prospects for Supreme Court Review
The questions to be presented in petition for certiorari connect directly to Amgen, e.g., whether a claim’s full-scope enablement requirement can be satisfied by a functional antibody genus recited within a method-of-treatment claim. The amicus support at the rehearing stage was notable: Amgen, Sanofi, Merck, Ipsen, and Johnson & Johnson—amici that Judge Dyk described as “not known for urging onerous requirements for patentability”—urged rehearing and warned of uncertainty for courts, the Patent Office, and industry.
However, only one judge dissented, the en banc poll failed, and the panel’s holding rests on a fact-specific record: Lilly’s prior IPR statements characterizing the antibodies as well known and their humanization as routine, an undisputed finding that all qualifying antibodies treat headache, and a posture in which the challenger bore a clear-and-convincing burden against a jury verdict. Teva will likely argue that the decision applies decades-old precedent on known components of a claimed combination, whereas Amgen addressed claims to novel antibodies themselves. And Pioneer and OssiFi-Mab give Teva anecdotal evidence that the feared drafting loophole has not materialized.
As such, the Supreme Court may view Teva as a narrow, fact-specific decision. If certiorari is denied, subsequent cases will be decided case-by-case where the key question is likely to be whether the recited genus was well-known.
Practical Takeaways
For patentees, Teva is not a reliable substitute for full-scope enablement of a functionally defined genus, particularly where the genus is new or the claimed use is its only use.
Claims of varying scope including claims to structurally defined species and subgenera supported by working examples and data remain the gold standard. The case is a reminder that positions taken in one forum can significantly impact the analysis in another. For example, characterizing a genus as well known and routine in an IPR or during prosecution may later support a finding that the genus is background technology for § 112 purposes. In both settings, the record including claim amendments, admissions, and arguments is likely to matter more than merely the claim format.
Disclaimer: The information contained in this posting does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice or express any opinion to be relied upon legally, for investment purposes or otherwise. If you would like to obtain legal advice relating to the subject matter addressed in this posting, please consult with us or your attorney. The information in this post is also based upon publicly available information, presents opinions, and does not represent in any way whatsoever the opinions or official positions of the entities or individuals referenced herein.














